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This paper examines the effects of the expansion of the water network in urban 
shantytowns in Argentina. We find large reductions in the presence, frequency, 
and severity of diarrhea episodes among children in the households reached by 
network expansions relative to the control group. Moreover, expanded water 
connections induce savings, as these families are able to substitute piped water for 
more expensive and distant sources of water. These health and savings effects are 
also important for households that previously had clandestine self-connections to 
the water network, which were free but of low quality. 
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1. Introduction 
Even though water is one of the most crucial elements for life, more than 20 percent of the 
world’s population does not have access to safe drinking water (WHO and UNICEF, 2004). 
Those who are not connected to the water system often resort to purchasing water from 
independent providers, and those who cannot afford it consume unsafe polluted water. This lack 
of access to safe drinking water is a serious threat to the health of disadvantaged populations, 
especially children. 
At the 2000 Millennium Summit, the member countries of the United Nations 
unanimously agreed on a set of eight goals to reduce poverty by 2015, including reducing child 
mortality by two-thirds and halving the number of households that do not have access to safe 
water. These two goals are interrelated because clean water is critical to containing the spread of 
infectious and parasitic diseases. Indeed, each year more than 3 million children die from 
preventable water-related diseases (World Bank, 2002) and a number of studies have found that 
access to safe water is associated with better child health (Merrick, 1985; Behrman and Wolfe, 
1987; Esrey et al., 1991; Lavy et al., 1996; Lee, Rosenzweig, and Pitt, 1997; and Jalan and 
Ravallion, 2003). 
Galiani et al. (2005) document large improvements in access to water and water quality 
as a result of the privatization of water companies in Argentina during the 1990s. In addition, 
they find that privatization led to a reduction in child mortality in poor and extremely poor 
regions. In spite of these improvements, however, a large fraction of the Argentine population, 
mainly poor, still lacks access to the water network, and there is concern about whether private 
companies have any incentives to serve extremely poor households. 
This paper examines the effects of a program of expansion of the water network in urban 
shantytowns undertaken by a privatized water company in Argentina. Relative to the control 
group, we find large reductions in the presence, severity, and duration of diarrhea episodes 
among children in the treated population, as well as reductions in water-related expenses. It turns 
out that unserved households need to rely on alternative sources of water that require greater 
monetary expenditures and higher transportation costs than households that have network 
connections. We also show that these health and savings effects are important for households   5
that previously had clandestine self-connections to the water network, which were free but of 
low quality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the privatization 
of the Buenos Aires water company, while. Section 3 describes a program of water expansion in 
shantytown neighborhoods. Section 4 presents the sampling design, Section 5 the estimation 
strategy, and Section 6 the empirical results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Water Privatization: The Case of Aguas Argentinas 
Argentina undertook a broad privatization program during the 1990s, which included the 
provision of water and sanitation services. In 1990, before privatization, public companies 
provided water service to two-thirds of the country’s municipalities, while not-for-profit 
cooperatives provided service to the remaining one-third. Between 1991 and 1999, about half of 
the public water companies, serving 28 percent of the country’s municipalities and almost 60 
percent of the country’s population, were transferred to private for-profit control. The largest 
water company privatization was that of the federal company Obras Sanitarias de la Nación 
(OSN), which provided service in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.  
In May 1993 Aguas Argentinas, a private consortium led by the French company 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, won a 35-year concession to provide water service previously provided by 
OSN.
2 The terms of the concession established service quality and waste-treatment standards. 
The terms also stipulated construction plans to expand the water network to 100 percent of 
households and the sewage network to 95 percent of households in metropolitan Buenos Aires by 
the end of the 35-year period. 
Privatization increased efficiency, productivity, and investments (Artana, Navajas, and 
Urbiztondo, 2000; Alcazar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002; Galiani et al., 2005). Several case studies 
show large increases in water and sewage production, reductions in spillage, and significant 
service enhancements. In addition, summer water shortages disappeared, repair delays shortened, 
and water pressure and cleanliness improved. These service improvements were accompanied by 
an almost 50 percent reduction in the number of Aguas Argentinas’ employees. The employment 
reduction, together with the increase in coverage and production, resulted in large productivity 
                                                           
2 Concessions, rather than the sale of assets to the private firms, are the most common method of privatizing water 
services worldwide (Noll, Shirley, and Cowan, 2000).   6
increases. Investments were particularly important in terms of increased access to the network. 
More than 2 million people in metropolitan Buenos Aires gained access to the water service, and 
about 1.24 million people gained access to the sewage network. In spite of this significant 
network expansion, however, more than 15 percent of the population is still not connected to the 
water network, and more than 40 percent still lacks access to the sewage network. This large 
unconnected fraction of the population is located in the poorest neighborhoods of metropolitan 
Buenos Aires. 
Although water privatization brought significant progress, if not universal connection, it 
was not popular in the opinion polls.
3 This was neither a particular characteristic of the water 
privatization nor particular to Argentina. Opinion polls and press articles report widespread 
discontent with privatization in general in Latin America (IDB, 2002; McKenzie and 
Mookherjee, 2003). The Argentine macroeconomic crisis of 2001-02 increased political tensions. 
The government did not allow the tariff increases stipulated in the contracts, and the private 
companies interrupted investments. The conflict between Aguas Argentinas and the government 
escalated until the water concession was cancelled in March 2006, and water provision was 
transferred to the newly created public company AySA.
4 However, the particular program of 
water expansion in shantytowns analyzed in this paper took place entirely before this 
renationalization. 
3. Expansion of Water in Shantytown Neighborhoods 
After 10 years of concession, several shantytown neighborhoods were still not connected to the 
water and sewage networks. A main regulatory problem for the expansion of the water network 
in shantytowns is that these areas are not formally urbanized and parcelized. This means that 
                                                           
3 The Buenos Aires water privatization did not imply a significant price increase. Indeed, water-use fees in Buenos 
Aires were initially lowered by 26.9 percent as a result of the privatization bid. However, 13 months after 
privatization, the regulator authorized a 13.5 percent increase in the usage fee, and a significant increase in 
connection fees. In response to protests, this high connection fee was later lowered to about one-tenth of the 
previous level, and a fixed charge was added to the water-use bills for all clients as a cross-subsidy. Some customers 
also suffered fee increases through property reclassifications (for most customers, fees are based on property 
characteristics, not on metered use). Indeed, the Buenos Aires water concession has been criticized for its frequent 
tariff renegotiations. For a general discussion on the evolution of tariffs under privatization in Latin America, see 
McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003); for the Argentine case, see Alcazar, Abdala, and Shirley (2002); Gerchunoff, 
Greco, and Bondorevsky (2003); and Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten (2003). 
4 Although only a few of the companies privatized during the 1990s have returned to public hands, Aguas 
Argentinas was not the only case. Other examples include the mail service, the water company of the Province of 
Buenos Aires (which returned to provincial administration after Enron’s bankruptcy), the public purchase of a 
fraction of the shares of the national airline company, and the creation of a new public energy company.   7
Aguas Argentinas was not licensed to provide service to them. In order to address the specific 
problem of water development in shantytowns, Aguas Argentinas created a department in 1999 
called Development of the Community (Desarrollo de la Comunidad) with the objective of 
designing a methodology to provide water and sewage services to shantytowns. Three years 
later, at the beginning of 2002, this department launched a specific expansion program, the 
Modelo Participativo de Gestión (MPG, or Participative Expansion Program), in collaboration 
with neighborhood communities, municipal governments, and the regulatory agency Ente 
Tripartito de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS). 
The program operated as follows. First, a poor neighborhood community had to ask 
Aguas Argentinas for provision of the service. Second, the firm evaluated the technical 
feasibility of the extension of water and/or sewage services to that area. The program did not 
include the extension of the primary water network, but only secondary connections. Thus, a 
technical condition was that the neighborhoods had to be less than two blocks away from a 
covered area. Third, if the provision of the service was technically feasible, Aguas Argentinas 
asked the neighborhood’s municipality for approval to initiate the program in the area. If the 
municipality approved the project, an agreement among the municipality, Aguas Argentinas, the 
neighborhood, and ETOSS was signed. This agreement stipulated the role and responsibilities of 
each party in the program. A salient characteristic of this contract was that beneficiary 
households agreed to provide the labor for the execution of the construction works in the 
neighborhood. In return for this work, Aguas Argentinas did not charge water connection fees to 
any household in the neighborhood. Once connected, the households had to pay a bimonthly 
service fee of about five pesos (around US$ 1.7) per household.
5 Households also agreed to 
eliminate all alternative installations of water, including any clandestine connections that might 
exist. 
A clandestine water connection is defined in this study as a water connection inside the 
house that was not provided by the water company. In our sample, about half of the households 
had a clandestine connection to the water network. It is worth emphasizing that this high 
percentage is not representative across the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, but was the result of 
the particular fact that the program was restricted to shantytowns less than two blocks away from 
                                                           
5 The standard connection fee at that time was 138.4 pesos, and the bimonthly service fee was 11 pesos. According 
to Aguas Argentinas, their labor costs for these connections would have amounted to 132.5 pesos.    8
connected neighborhoods. Because clandestine connections cannot be carried out over long 
distances, they are particularly developed in close-by shantytowns, where it is also very difficult 
for water company personnel to get safe access to the connections to shut them down. 
The MPG was an institutional arrangement in which public institutions (the water 
regulatory agency and the municipal government), a private firm, and the community came 
together to provide piped water and/or sewage services to poor neighborhoods. The program was 
institutionalized through a contract among Aguas Argentinas, the neighborhood, and the 
neighborhood’s municipality. ETOSS supervised and authorized the whole process. 
It is important to consider this arrangement in the context of Argentina’s macroeconomic 
situation. During the 1990s, the country began massive market reforms. However, the 
performance of labor markets during that period was very disappointing. Poverty and 
unemployment increased and income distribution worsened (see Altimir and Beccaria, 1998). 
Social conditions sharply deteriorated during the 2001-02 crisis, when the Argentine GDP 
plummeted, unemployment exploded, and significant inflation affected the purchasing power of 
Argentine households. At the end of 2003, when the research for this paper began, around 6 
million people—of a total population of 12.6 million in GBA—were living on less than 3 dollars 
per day.
6 Of those living in poverty, 44 percent were considered indigent, meaning they lived on 
a dollar per day or less. Although the number of people below the poverty line began to decline, 
it still remained very high at around 31 percent by the end of 2005, in spite of strong GDP 
growth—around 9 percent—in 2003, 2004, and 2005. These figures highlight the enormous 
magnitude of the poverty problem in Argentina. 
According to Aguas Argentinas,
7 by 2002 there were 593 shantytown neighborhoods with 
an estimated population of 2.5 million people within the concession area. Of this total, 445 
neighborhoods with an estimated population of 1.1 million people were within the limits covered 
by the water network but were without service because of the lack of urbanization and 
parcelization. The Aguas Argentinas MPG program was a partial attempt to overcome this 
problem by developing the provision of water and/or sewage service to shantytowns located in 
the concession area. The program would also improve the public image of the company by 
showing its concern for the poor. The conditions for participating in the program were: 
                                                           
6 See INDEC (2003, 2004). 
7 See Botton, Braïlowsky, and Matthieussent (2003).   9
•  The shantytown community had to request the service. The neighbors had to be organized 
and they had to elect representatives to form a community assembly to interact with the 
other actors in the program. The community also provided labor for construction. 
•  The neighborhood municipality contractually agreed to undertake certain activities: 
assigning a supervisor of works; ordering the opening of streets (if required); assigning, if 
necessary, people with assistential work plans to do the construction work in front of 
churches, health centers, schools, and other community buildings in the neighborhood; 
and distributing work tools (gloves, spades, etc.). 
•  Aguas Argentinas had to guarantee the technical feasibility of the project. It agreed to 
deliver the necessary materials (pipes, keys, etc.) and to assure the technical formation of 
the labor force through several training workshops on work techniques and aspects of 
labor security. The company was also responsible for communicating the commercial 
aspects of the service to the community’s assembly. It additionally organized social 
workshops for families in the neighborhoods in order to develop a good relationship 
between the new clients and the firm, and to provide information about the potential 
health gains from water infrastructure improvements and about the benefits from 
responsible use of the service. 
 
After the program’s connection works were finished, the households in the neighborhood 
were incorporated as clients of Aguas Argentinas, and each household had to pay a bimonthly 
service fee of about five pesos. 
In 2003, 33 MPG projects were approved by the water company and the respective 
municipal governments. As of October 2003, agreements had already been signed for 17 of these 
projects. Of these, 6 MPG projects were already finalized, 9 were ready to begin, and 2 were 
signed but the starting date was not yet scheduled. Agreements for the remaining 16 projects had 
not yet been signed (though all of the 33 MPG projects were eventually executed by the 
program). Table 1 shows these projects divided by location. The different progress of these 
projects may have been due to the different times at which the neighborhoods presented their 
requests (which, in turn, may reflect different organizational structures), to delays in obtaining 
approval and construction tools from the municipality, or to delays in obtaining technical 
approval, construction materials, and workshop developments from the company. The different   10
timing may also be related to geographic neighborhood characteristics, such as the distance to 
the water network or the need to open a new street.  
 
Table 1. MPG Projects (as of October 2003) 









Signed  Ready to 
Begin Finalized 
South Region GBA  10  18,320  5  4  1 
North Region GBA  15  9,350  12  5  5 
West Region GBA  4  3,445  0  0  0 
Buenos Aires City  4  18,832  0  0  0 
Total 33  48,947  17  9  6 
 
Source: “Hacia un acceso universal a los servicios. El modelo participativo de gestión.”  “Ready 
to Begin” means that the contract agreement among the municipality, the neighborhood, Aguas 
Argentinas and ETOSS was already signed and the training workshops and social activities were 
scheduled but the works had not yet begun. 
 
4. Sampling Design 
In order to study the impact of these MPG projects on the health and expenditures of poor 
households, we conducted a before-and-after study comparing the performance in treated 
neighborhoods relative to a control group. Since the MPG programs began with a community’s 
request for service connection, we selected as the control group neighborhoods that had asked 
Aguas Argentinas for water service, but that for administrative reasons were not included in the 
program. Our before-and-after strategy allows us to use household fixed effects to address the 
potential presence of time-invariant differences between treatment and control groups. 
For the treatment group, of the 33 projects in Table 1, we only considered the 27 
neighborhoods where the MPG programs were not finalized by the beginning of the first survey 
(mid-February 2004). Moreover, we focused on the 25 neighborhoods that had requested 
connection only to the water network, not the sewage network.
8 Within this group, we selected 
six neighborhoods to be sampled, stratifying the projects by region and choosing neighborhoods 
that belonged to different municipalities throughout Greater Buenos Aires.  
 
 
                                                           
8 Sewage construction takes much longer, impeding comparability. Two neighborhoods were excluded for this 
reason.   11
Table 2. Neighborhoods in the Treatment Group 
Number of Households 










North San  Jose  107  41  July, 2004 
North Cina  Cina  400  70 
September, 
2004 
West San  Miguel  209  50  April, 2004 
West Hipólito  Yrigoyen  198  40 
September, 
2004 
South La  Tablada  360  70  April, 2004 
South  10 de Enero  271  95  May, 2004 
Total   1,545  366   
 
In addition to these six neighborhoods participating in the MPG program, we selected 
three neighborhoods to form a control group. These three control neighborhoods were chosen 
from a group of seven neighborhoods that had asked Aguas Argentinas for water service through 
the MPG project, but that for administrative reasons were not included in the program. Table 3 
presents information on these neighborhoods. 
 
Table 3. Neighborhoods in the Control Group 
Number of Households  
Region Neighborhood 
Population Sample 
North Villa  Lanzone  435  94 
North Villa  Hidalgo  554  95 
South La  Rivera  120  80 
Total   1,109  269 
 
Once all neighborhoods were defined, we conducted a systematic household survey of 
each neighborhood. Our pollsters had a sketch of each neighborhood and a previously defined 
pathway, guaranteeing that we covered the whole neighborhood. The survey included questions 
regarding the incidence of water-related illnesses among young children (less than 6 years old),
9 
hygiene habits, trips to medical centers, medical consultations related to water-related illnesses, 
and household socioeconomic characteristics. 
                                                           
9 The incidence was taken for the month of reference (i.e., one month before the survey was conducted).    12
The baseline survey was conducted in the last two weeks of February and the first week 
of March 2004, and the follow-up survey was conducted in the same weeks of 2005. The last 
column in Table 2 indicates the date of finalization of the program in each neighborhood.
10  
In October 2004, the regular Aguas Argentinas water network expansion reached the “La 
Rivera” neighborhood and, as a consequence, some of the sampled households in that control 
neighborhood gained access to water service by November of that year. Since our first survey 
had already been conducted in that neighborhood, we accordingly redefined the treatment and 
control observations, transferring the connected households from the control group to the 
treatment group.
11 
In order to compare the pre-treatment characteristics of the treated and control groups, 
Table 4 shows mean equality tests for several variables using the survey conducted in February 
and March 2004. Both groups share similar characteristics in terms of houses and heads of 
households, which made treatment and control groups comparable. There is a 20 peso difference 
between the per capita family income
12 of control and treatments groups. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
                                                           
10 Before the survey, it was essential to contact some key people in each neighborhood who could guarantee the 
safety of the pollsters. These key people were community leaders, schoolteachers, or priests in the neighborhood. In 
order to have a low non-response rate, we agreed with these leaders to donate educational material to each 
neighborhood school. 
11 As shown in Appendix B, the results are robust to excluding from the analysis all the observations from the “La 
Rivera” neighborhood and they are also robust to excluding only those households that received water in that 
neighborhood.  
12 For those families in both groups that did not report their income during the survey, we imputed family income 
using the hotdeck methodology within neighborhoods using age, formal education, and gender of the head of 
household as stratification variables.    13









Gender of head of household (HH)  0.778  0.804  0.026 
 (0.02)  (0.029)  (0.035) 
Education of HH (years)  7.347  7.284  -0.063 
 (0.125)  (0.21)  (0.244) 
Marital status of HH (married=1)  0.721  0.778  0.057 
 (0.021)  (0.03)  (0.037) 
Nationality of HH (foreigner=1)  0.134  0.093  -0.041 
 (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.026) 
Employment of HH (employed=1)  0.89  0.88  -0.01 
 (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
Unemployment of HH (unemployed=1)  0.11  0.12  0.01 
 (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
Age of HH  41.347  45.314  3.967** 
 (0.679)  (0.895)  (1.123) 
House has a bad roof  0.057  0.066  0.009 
 (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.022) 
House has electricity  0.973  0.985  0.012 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Water used for cooking is from clandestine connection  0.519  0.554  0.035 
 (0.024)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
Water used for personal hygiene is from clandestine 
connection 0.519  0.549  0.03 
 (0.024)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
Water used for drinking is from clandestine connection  0.482  0.477  -0.005 
 (0.024)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
Per capita family income   140.02  120.07  19.948** 
 (8.35)  (4.86)  (9.66) 
Notes: ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
5. Estimation Strategy 
Our main objective is to identify the impact of the MPG water network expansion on children’s 
health status and on the water-related expenses of these households. We are first interested in the 
average effect of access to the water network on water-related illnesses in young children less 
than six years old. In particular, we measure these water-related illnesses through the presence of 
diarrhea episodes in young children during the month before the surveys were conducted, the 
duration of those episodes, and whether those episodes included blood or parasites (as a way to 
assess their severity).   14
Given the ex ante poor quality of the water provision in the neighborhoods, most 
households bought bottled water to drink—regardless of whether they had clandestine 
connections to water services.
13 Thus, we are also interested in changes in water-related 
expenditures as a result of the MPG program. Note that this effect is very important since the 
potential increase in fees under privatization for those people already connected to the service 
provision has been frequently discussed. However, the savings for those who gained access and 
had been purchasing water from more expensive sources has been mainly ignored in public 
debates. 
Assessing the impacts of access to the water network can be done by comparing the 
health or economic output of interest in those neighborhoods where the program has been 
applied with the same outcome in counterfactual neighborhoods—in other words, in the same 
treatment neighborhoods at the same point in time but without the application of the program. 
Since this counterfactual is not observed, we need to estimate it. Ideally, we would like to 
randomly assign access to the water system across neighborhoods. In the absence of this 
randomized trial we estimate the impacts of interest using the non-experimental method of 
difference in differences. 
The difference-in-differences model can be specified as a two-way fixed effect linear 
regression model: 
it i t it it it x I y ε μ λ β α + + + + =  
where yit is the outcome of interest—such as the presence of diarrhea episodes, duration and 
severity of these episodes, water-related expenses, etc.—for household (child) i in year t; Iit is an 
indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if household (child) i received water network 
treatment in year t; xit is a vector of control variables; λt is a time effect; µi is a household fixed 
effect; and εit is the error term. 
6. Results 
First, we study the effect on child health of gaining access to piped water through the water 
network. Table 5 shows very large reductions in the presence of diarrhea episodes (measured 
with a dummy variable), the duration of those episodes (measured in days), and their severity 
                                                           
13 Bottled water comes in 5, 10, or 20 liters, and the retail price of the 10-liter bottle is around 3.60 pesos (US$1.2). 
In the baseline, water-related expenditures represented 5.3 percent of average household income.   15
(whether the episodes included blood and/or parasites). The effects are always significant at 
conventional levels. Controlling for changes in household income, we find that diarrhea episodes 
decrease by as much as 90 percent of the baseline incidence. Besides reducing the number of 
diarrhea episodes, access to piped water shows reductions in the duration and severity of those 
episodes. This evidence complements the findings of Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) 
on child mortality. In this case, the provision of potable water has a positive effect on reducing 
health morbidity. 
 




Presence of diarrhea 
episodes 
Duration of diarrhea 
episodes. 
Severity of diarrhea 
episodes 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                
Iit -0.1047**  -0.1274*  -0.9359  -1.1241 
-
0.0644** -0.0814*
   (0.0525)  (0.0737)  (0.4707) (0.6581) (0.0320) (0.0488) 
 {0.0464}  {0.0691} {0.5383} {0.7938} {0.0339}  {0.0524}
% change  -74.26  -90.35  -84.13  -101.04  -87.38  -110.45 
                 
Per capita income     -0.0001     -0.0003     0.0003 
      (0.0004)     (0.0036)     (0.0004) 
   {0.0004}   {0.0036}   {0.0005}
                    
Household Fixed 
Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period Fixed 
Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean dependent 
variable  0.1410  0.1410 1.1125 1.1125 0.0737 0.0737 
Observations  819  649 819 649 819 649 
R-squared  0.53  0.56 0.50 0.52 0.46 0.47 
Notes: The regressions are run at the child level for children less than six years old. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered at the household-period level to address potential correlation among 
children of the same household are in curly brackets. The percentage change is computed using the sample 
average of the dependent variable in the first survey as the baseline level. Statistical significance calculated using 
the robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 
1 percent.  
 
 
An important issue is that approximately half of the treated group was connected 
clandestinely to the water network and was receiving water, but it was of poor quality. This is   16
shown in Table 6, which presents reported improvements in water after the treated areas were 
connected to the water system. 
 
Table 6. Changes in the Perception of Water Quality before and after Treatment 
 
Treatment Group (in percentages) 
Color Taste Odor  Pressure 
Quality 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Very good  1.06  16.25  0.71 13.43 0.71 12.37  0.00 19.08
Good  52.65 74.91 53.71 72.08 55.48 73.14 36.75 59.36
Regular 30.04  7.07  28.27 11.31 26.86 11.66  15.55 7.77
Bad 12.37  1.41  13.07 2.47 13.43 2.47  32.86 5.30
Very bad  3.18  0.35  2.47 0.00 2.47 0.00  12.72 8.13
No  answer  0.71 0.00 1.77 0.71 1.06 0.35 2.12 0.35
 
Tables 7 and 8 present the effect of access to the water network on the distance walked 
by household members to bring water to the house (Table 7) and on water-related expenditures 
by families (Table 8). Table 7 uses as dependent variable the distance (measured in 100-meter 
blocks) traveled by household members to the nearest hand-pumped well in order to bring water 
to the house. The program shows a statistically significant effect in reducing the distance 
traveled by household members to bring water to the house. 
 
Table 7. Effect on the Distance Walked to Procure Water 
 
Dependent Variable: 





Iit -0.8303***  -0.8682*** 
   (0.1492)  (0.1936) 
% change  -77.48  -81.02 
       
Per capita income     0.0005 
      (0.0007) 
        
Household Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Period Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Mean dependent variable  1.0716  1.0716 
Observations 934  724 
R-squared 0.97  0.98 
Notes: The regressions are run at the household level. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. The percentage change is computed using the sample average of 
the dependent variable in the first survey as the baseline level. * significant at 10 
percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.    17
 
Finally, the program also contributed to reducing the money families allocated to water-
related expenditures. Table 8 shows that, on average, families in the treatment group spent about 
20 to 22 pesos per month (around US$ 7 to 7.5) less than families in the control group that 
bought water. This evidence implies that the provision of potable water through the MPG 
program reduced water-related expenditures between 85 and 95 percent with respect to the 
sample average of water-related expenditures at the baseline level. These savings represent 
around 4.5 percent of average total family income in the baseline survey for the treatment group. 
 







including payment for water 
service after the program 
Dependent variable 
 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
           
Iit -21.8678***  -19.7232**  -19.2469***  -17.1078** 
   (6.3073)  (8.0001)  (6.2267)  (7.9029) 
%  change  -94.97  -85.65 -83.59 -74.30 
            
Per capita income     -0.0001     0.0000 
      (0.0175)     (0.0174) 
       
Household  Fixed  Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Period  Fixed  Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Mean  dependent  variable  23.0266  23.0266 23.0266 23.0266 
Observations  483  369 483 369 
R-squared  0.85  0.88 0.85 0.88 
Notes: The regressions are run at the household level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 
percentage change is computed using the sample average of the dependent variable in the first survey as the 
baseline level. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.  
 
Finally, Table 9 presents evidence on the allocation of this extra money by treated 
households. Families connected to the water network allocated most of the water savings to food 
consumption. 
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Table 9. Actual Spending of the Money Saved  
from Water-Related Expenditures in the Treatment Group 
 
Expenditures on:  Percentages
Food/Beverages 67.61
Personal items  2.82




General expenses  14.08
No answer  4.23
 
Another important question is whether the expansion of the water network had positive or 
negative impacts on households in the treatment group that already had a clandestine self-
connection to the water network. On the one hand, the expansion program meant that these 
families had to pay for something they were already receiving for free. On the other hand, these 
clandestine self-connections are of inadequate quality in terms of water pollution and low 
pressure. Table 10 differentially analyzes the effect of the MPG expansion for previously 
unconnected and clandestinely connected households. The results broadly show that the health 
and savings effects are about half for the clandestinely connected than they are for the previously 
unconnected, but in both cases the effects are large.  
 
Table 10. Differential Effects for Unconnected Households and Households  




























    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
-0.1358** -0.6544 -0.0802**  -1.1154***  -29.9020*  Water for unconnected  
households  (0.0607) (0.4757) (0.0398) (0.2146)  (16.9421) 
 {0.0557}  {0.4659} {0.0452}     
% change  -96.31  -58.82  -108.82  -104.09  -129.86 
-0.0686 -1.2626* -0.0461  -0.6079***  -19.6430***  Water for households 
with  
clandestine connection  (0.0586)  (0.7392) (0.0339) (0.2059)  (5.9026) 
 {0.0505}  {0.9584} {0.0336}     
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Table 10., continued 



























%  change  -48.65 -113.49 -62.55  -56.73  -85.31 
              
Household Fixed 
Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Period  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Mean dependent 
variable  0.1410 1.1125 0.0737 1.0716  23.0266 
Observations  819 819 819 934  483 
R-squared  0.529 0.505 0.458 0.972  0.851 
Notes: The regressions in columns (1) to (3) are run at the child level, whereas columns (4) and (5) are run at the 
household level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered at the household-period 
level to address potential correlation among children of the same household are in curly brackets. The percentage 
change is computed using the sample average of the dependent variable in the first survey as the baseline level. 
These results do not change if per capita income is included as a regressor. Statistical significance calculated using 




In this paper, we study the effects of a specific program of water expansion in urban shantytowns 
undertaken by a privatized company in Argentina. We find large reductions in diarrhea episodes, 
their duration, and their severity among children in the treated population. We also record a 
significant reduction in water-related expenses, since piped water is cheaper than bottled water. 
We also show that these health and savings effects are important for households that previously 
had a clandestine self-connection to the water network, which was free but low quality.  
Our results highlight two main findings that are important as policy lessons. First, there 
are significant savings from gaining access to the water network for those households that 
previously had to rely on alternative water sources (such as bottled water, clandestine 
connections, or water transported from distant wells). These savings are overlooked in traditional 
analyses of the privatization of water services. Second, the apparent monetary loss for those 
households when replacing their free clandestine self-connection with a formal water network 
connection may be overcome by important health improvements. 
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Appendices: 
A. Definition of Variables 
 
Presence of diarrhea episodes. Dummy variable adopting the value of 1 if the child (less than 
six years old) has had diarrhea in the reference month (one month before the survey was 
conducted). 
Duration of episodes. Number of days the last diarrhea episode lasted.  
Severity of the episode. Dummy variable adopting the value of 1 if the last diarrhea episode 
included blood and/or parasites. 
Distance to well. Distance measured in blocks that a member of the family had to travel to bring 
water to the house from the nearest hand-pumped well. 
Water-related expenditures. Monthly monetary expenditures on bottled water. 
 
 



















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Iit  -0.0853 -0.8270 -0.0346  -0.7294***  -17.6393*** 
    (0.0523) (0.5103) (0.0308) (0.1595) (4.6200) 
   {0.0460}  {0.6048} {0.0325}     
%  change  -60.16 -82.63 -66.03 -68.91 -86.30 
          
Household  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean  dependent  variable  0.1418 1.0009 0.0524 1.0585  20.4392 
Observations  761 761 761 883 437 
R-squared  0.57 0.54 0.52 0.98 0.92 
Notes: The regressions in columns (1) to (3) are run at the child level, whereas columns (4) and (5) are run at the household 
level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered at the household-period level to address 
potential correlation among children of the same household are in curly brackets. The percentage change is computed using 
the sample average of the dependent variable in the first survey as the baseline level. Statistical significance calculated 
using robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 
percent.  
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